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Surveillance for Adverse Events Associated with Anthrax Vaccination — U.S. Department of Defense, 1998–2000

Concerns about the potential use of anthrax as a biologic weapon prompted the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to announce on December 15, 1997, anthrax vaccination of all U.S. military personnel. This effort is coordinated by the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP). AVIP plans a phased vaccination process to achieve total force protection against anthrax by 2004. The current phase of implementation includes vaccination of all service members and mission-essential DoD civilian employees assigned or deployed to high-threat areas. On the basis of program monitoring, as of April 12, 2000, 425,976 service members had received 1,620,793 doses of anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) (Bioport, Inc.,* Lansing, Michigan). Some service members have cited concerns about vaccine safety and efficacy in their decision to refuse vaccination, despite the possibility of administrative or disciplinary actions. To assess anthrax vaccination safety, DoD has conducted surveys of vaccinated personnel. This report describes three completed or ongoing surveys (1). The findings indicate that rates of local reactions were higher in women than men and that no patterns of unexpected local or systemic adverse events have been identified.

Survey of Self-Reported Reactions to AVA, U.S. Forces, Korea

At one of the largest vaccination sites for United States Forces, Korea, a mandatory, self-administered prevaccination questionnaire was used to obtain data on health status (including pregnancy, if applicable), medication use, and reactions to the previous dose of AVA. The questionnaire was designed to record service members' concerns about AVA and their reports of adverse events (i.e., a medical condition following vaccination that could be related to the vaccine) to promote risk communication between health-care providers and service members. Data from 6879 questionnaires completed during September–October 1998 were reviewed. Approximately 37% (2531 of 6879) of respondents were service members receiving their first dose; records were analyzed for 4348 (63%) service members who already had received and could comment on their first (2427) or second (1921) vaccine doses.


^{*}Use of trade names and commercial sources is for identification only and does not imply endorsement by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Female service members reported higher rates of reactions to the previous dose of vaccine, regardless of the time period after vaccination (Figure 1). For both men and women, most reported that events were localized, minor, self-limited, and did not lead to impaired work performance, lost work time beyond that required to seek care, and/or a clinic visit or hospitalization. After the first or second dose, 82 (1.9%) of 4348 reported that their work performance had been limited to some extent or that they were placed on limited duty, 13 (0.3%) reported ≥ 1 day lost from work, 21 (0.5%) consulted a clinic for evaluation, and one (0.02%) required hospitalization for an injection site reaction.

Tripler Army Medical Center Survey of AVA Safety

Tripler Army Medical Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, assessed the frequency and nature of AVA adverse events in a cohort of 603 U.S. military health-care workers in the Korea Medical Augmentee Program. These personnel began receiving anthrax vaccination during September 1998. A self-administered questionnaire was used to collect data prospectively for systemic reactions. Data on local reactions were collected retrospectively for the first three doses and prospectively for the remaining doses. Persons responded to questions on symptoms, signs, time taken off from duty, hospitalizations, and medical visits. Medical records were reviewed and information was obtained from health-care providers about participants who sought medical care, missed one or more work shifts, or had any reaction that might exempt them from further vaccination. Data

FIGURE 1. Self-reported reactions to anthrax vaccine — United States Forces, Korea, September–October 1998



collection up to the fourth AVA dose of the six-dose initial series was complete for 479 (79.4%) of 603 persons. Of the remaining 124 (20.6%), 11 were not vaccinated because of pregnancy, four were exempted from the survey for medical reasons, and the rest were lost to follow-up primarily because of reassignment.

After the first anthrax dose, 47 (7.9%) of 595 reported seeking medical advice and/or taking time off work for a complaint (e.g., muscle or joint aches, headache, or fatigue); after the second dose, 30 (5.1%) of 585; after the third dose, 16 (3.0%) of 536; and after the fourth dose, 17 (3.1%) of 536.

Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS)

DoD uses the CDC and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Form VAERS-1 to report events potentially related to any vaccination to VAERS and to each military service's disease reporting system. VAERS reports related to anthrax vaccinations are consolidated for AVIP by the Defense Medical Surveillance System. As of April 7, 2000, 428 VAERS-1 reports had been received through DoD. Of these, 311 (72.7%) concerned systemic reactions, 78 (18.2%) were reports on mild or moderate local reactions, and 39 (9.1%) were for large or complicated local reactions. Thirty-six (8.4%) reactions met the DoD mandatory reporting criteria (i.e., hospitalization and/or time off duty >24 hours). None were related to suspected vaccine lot contamination.

A panel of civilian scientific and medical experts established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services at DoD's request reviewed all VAERS-1 reports, including those reported directly to FDA or CDC. As of March 21, 2000, the panel has not identified any unexpected patterns of adverse events among 674 reports reviewed.

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Editorial Note: Anthrax is considered a biologic weapons threat because of its stability in spore form, its ease of culture, the absence of natural immunity in industrialized nations, and severity of infection in its gastrointestinal and inhalational forms. If untreated, the case-fatality rate of inhaled anthrax exceeds 80% (2,3).

At least seven nations are suspected to have actively pursued biologic weapons programs (3,4). Anthrax also has been used at least once by terrorist groups (3,4). U.S. service members deployed to future military confrontations may be at risk for attack by biologic warfare agents. The DoD, through the AVIP, seeks to reduce these threats.

Human anthrax vaccine was licensed by FDA in 1970 as a six-dose primary series with annual boosters. It is an aluminum hydroxide-adsorbed, cell-free, noninfectious vaccine prepared from a noncapsulating, nonproteolytic anthrax strain. Licensing was based on safety data, the results of a controlled efficacy trial, and observational data documenting substantial protection against anthrax (5,6). Studies in nonhuman primates also have documented protection (7). The safety and efficacy of this vaccine was affirmed by an independent advisory panel in 1985 (5).

This mandatory vaccination program has posed substantial challenges to DoD. Some service members are reluctant to be vaccinated because of concern about adverse events. These concerns may be heightened by the number of doses required and by allegations linking vaccination with illnesses in Gulf War veterans. Conversely,

some service members may not report adverse events after vaccination because of concerns that they will not be able to complete the vaccination series, thereby limiting career advancement options.

The findings in this report provide information on rates of local and systemic adverse events occurring after anthrax vaccination was delivered as part of a routine program rather than in clinical trials. The findings suggest that rates of local reactions were higher in women than men and that no patterns of unexpected local or systemic adverse events have been identified. Reasons for the higher rates in women are unknown.

The studies reported here are subject to several methodologic limitations, including sample size, the power to detect rare adverse events, loss to follow-up, and exemption of vaccine recipients with previous adverse events. For example, in the U.S. Forces, Korea, study, any service members medically deferred after a previous AVA dose would have been missed by the survey; therefore, adverse events may have been underreported. In the Tripler survey, data were collected retrospectively for the first three doses and then prospectively, potentially resulting in recall or observational bias. In addition, in the Tripler survey, the absence of an unvaccinated control group limited the ability to assess an association of adverse events with anthrax vaccination. The studies were not designed to detect or quantify chronic or long-term adverse events.

Ongoing activities at DoD, CDC, and FDA are targeted toward improving methods to communicate the benefits and risks for vaccination, enhancing surveillance for vaccine adverse events, and continuing to monitor the safety of the program. These interventions may be useful to enhance AVIP.

Risk-communication programs, such as the one in U.S. Forces, Korea, encourage a positive and supportive patient-provider relationship. Surveillance through the VAERS system to detect signals of potential adverse events followed by epidemiologic investigations to evaluate these signals remains important. Potential methodologies for monitoring safety include comparing vaccinated and unvaccinated groups or comparing groups shortly after vaccination with groups whose vaccinations were more distal.

Pilot studies have evaluated intramuscular vaccine administration to reduce rates of local adverse events. Additional studies are planned to expand these data and to determine whether the number of doses required in the primary vaccination series can be reduced while maintaining immunogenicity and protection.

AVIP maintains a World-Wide Web site (http://www.anthrax.osd.mil)[†] with information on the program and electronic mail access to AVIP staff. A toll-free information line for inquiries from health-care providers, service members, and the public also is available (telephone [877] 438-8222).

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[†] References to sites of non-CDC organizations on the Internet are provided as a service to *MMWR* readers and do not constitute or imply endorsement of these organizations or their programs by CDC or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. CDC is not responsible for the content of pages found at these sites.

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Serogroup W-135 Meningococcal Disease Among Travelers Returning From Saudi Arabia — United States, 2000

On April 9, 2000, CDC was notified by national public health agencies in several European countries of cases of serogroup W-135 meningococcal disease among pilgrims returning from the Hajj in Mecca and their close contacts. As of April 20, 2000, the New York City Department of Health had reported three cases of serogroup W-135 meningococcal disease in the United States.

One patient was a returning pilgrim who had been vaccinated with the meningococcal quadrivalent polysaccharide vaccine, and one was a household contact of a returning pilgrim. The third patient did not participate in the Hajj and had no household or other close contacts who had traveled to Mecca; however, 5 days before illness onset the patient may have interacted with returning pilgrims or their families. The three patients had no identified shared contacts or associations. Two patients had isolation of serogroup W-135 *Neisseria meningitidis* from the blood; in the third patient, the pathogen was isolated from joint fluid. Serogroup classification of the first two isolates has been confirmed as W-135 at CDC; both isolates were subserotype P1.5,2 by PorA gene sequencing. Multilocus enzyme electrophoresis typing results are pending. These are the only cases identified among the 11,000 pilgrims reported to have traveled from the United States to Saudi Arabia for this year's Hajj, which concluded on March 17. No deaths from W-135 meningococcal disease have been reported among pilgrims returning to the United States.

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Editorial Note: As of April 20, 2000, 40 cases of serogroup W-135 meningococcal disease among Hajj pilgrims or their close contacts have been reported to the World Health Organization by national health authorities in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Oman (1). In addition, 199 cases of meningococcal disease were reported from Saudi Arabia, including 30 of serogroup W-135 and 55 of serogroup A. This is the largest recorded outbreak of serogroup W-135 meningococcal disease. In the United States, W-135 accounts for 3%–4% of meningococcal disease (2) and previously has not been associated with an outbreak. Meningococcal disease most commonly is manifested as bacteremia or meningitis but can present as septic arthritis or pneumonia.

Prompted by a serogroup A meningococcal disease outbreak associated with the 1987 Hajj (3,4), Saudi Arabia began to require meningococcal vaccine for all entering

Meningococcal Disease — Continued

pilgrims; however, the vaccine formulation varies by country. Most U.S. pilgrims probably received the quadrivalent polysaccharide vaccine covering serogroups A, C, Y, and W-135, because it is the only meningococcal vaccine distributed in the United States. Meningococcal serogroup A and C polysaccharide vaccines have clinical efficacies of 85%–100% (5). Vaccination with W-135 polysaccharide induces bactericidal antibody, although clinical protection has not been documented. Nevertheless, cases among U.S. pilgrims could occur from polysaccharide vaccine failure or from having been vaccinated in countries using a bivalent A and C vaccine. Because the polysaccharide vaccine does not prevent or eliminate carriage, close contacts of returning pilgrims may be at risk.

Health departments and health-care providers should be aware of possible meningo-coccal disease among persons who recently traveled to Saudi Arabia or their household contacts who may not have traveled. Surveillance by local and state health departments should be enhanced for cases of meningococcal disease in persons who may have had contact with returning pilgrims or their families, or for any case of serogroup W-135 meningococcal disease. Health departments in areas with substantial numbers of returning pilgrims should consider disseminating information on the signs and symptoms of meningococcal disease, particularly among returning pilgrims and their household contacts.

If possible cases are identified, health-care providers should contact the local or state health department and CDC's Meningitis and Special Pathogens Branch, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases, telephone (404) 639-3158. Any isolates should be saved and sent to CDC for further analysis.

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Alcohol Policy and Sexually Transmitted Disease Rates — United States, 1981–1995

In the United States, adolescents and young adults are at higher risk for acquiring sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) than older adults (1). In addition, young persons who drink alcohol may be more likely than persons who abstain to participate in high-risk sexual activity, such as unprotected sexual intercourse or multiple sexual partners (2). If alcohol consumption promotes risky sexual behavior (disinhibition caused by the effects of alcohol), state government alcohol policies, such as alcohol taxation and minimum legal drinking age requirements, might reduce STD incidence among adolescents and young adults. Higher alcohol taxes and increases in the minimum legal drinking age have been associated with lower incidences of adverse alcohol-related health outcomes

Alcohol Policies and STDs — Continued

(e.g., motor-vehicle crash-related deaths, liver cirrhosis, suicide, and violent crime, including domestic violence) (3,4). This report summarizes the findings of a study (5) that suggest higher alcohol taxes and higher minimum legal drinking ages are associated with lower STD incidence among certain age groups.

The study examined the association between crude gonorrhea incidence (new cases per 100,000 population) and alcohol policy indicators (alcohol taxation and drinking age requirements) in the 50 states and the District of Columbia during 1981–1995. Alcohol policy data were obtained from the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (6,7), and gonorrhea incidence data were collected by CDC through surveillance systems in each state (1). The relation between alcohol policy and gonorrhea rates was established using a quasi-experimental analysis of a state's gonorrhea rate during the year before and after a change was made in the state alcohol policy indicators and a multivariate regression analysis between state gonorrhea rates and state alcohol policy indicators.

The quasi-experimental analysis compared changes in gonorrhea rates in states with a beer tax increase (experimental states) with changes in gonorrhea rates in states without a beer tax increase (control states). An experimental state had a relative decrease in its gonorrhea rate if the decrease was greater (in percentage) than the median of the control states. To test the null hypothesis that beer tax increases had no effect on gonorrhea rates, p-values were calculated as two-tailed tests from the binomial distribution under the null hypothesis that each change in the gonorrhea rate in experimental states would have a 0.50 probability of being a relative decrease. A quasi-experimental analysis of drinking age increases also was conducted.

In the regression analysis, the dependent variable was the state-specific gonorrhea rate, and the alcohol policy indicators were independent variables. The model included variables for each state and each year to control for state-specific differences in gonorrhea incidence and trends in gonorrhea incidence common to all states. To further control the models for omitted and/or unobservable factors (e.g., state-level demographic characteristics and STD-prevention activities) related to state-specific STD rates and trends, the model included the state's gonorrhea rate during the previous year as an independent variable.

Most beer tax increases were followed by a relative proportionate decrease in gonorrhea rates among young adults (24 [66.7%] of 36 instances of beer tax increases among 15–19-year-olds [p<0.10] and 26 [72.2%] of 36 instances among 20–24-year-olds [p<0.05]) (Table 1). In both age groups, this relation was greater for gonorrhea rates among men than women. Most minimum legal drinking age increases were followed by a relative proportionate decrease in the gonorrhea rate, and this majority was statistically significant among 15–19-year-olds (29 [65.9%] of 44 instances of minimum legal drinking age increases) but not among 20–24-year-olds (18 [54.5%] of 33 instances). Regression analysis also showed that higher beer taxes were associated with lower gonorrhea rates among young adults in both age groups, and that minimum legal drinking age increases were associated with lower gonorrhea rates among 15–19-year-olds. The regression analysis suggested that a beer tax increase of \$0.20 per six-pack could reduce overall gonorrhea rates by 8.9%.

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Editorial Note: The findings in this report indicate that more restrictive state alcohol policies are associated with lower gonorrhea rates among certain age groups. The two

Alcohol Policies and STDs — Continued

TABLE 1. Number and percentage of state beer tax increases or minimum legal drinking age increases followed by decreases in state-specific gonorrhea rates, by age group and sex — United States, 1981–1995*

	Beer tax	Drinking age increases§			
Age group/Sex	No.	(%)	No.	(%)	
15–19 yrs	24¶	(66.7)	29**	(65.9)	
Men	28**	(77.8)	29**	(65.9)	
Women	22	(61.1)	27	(61.4)	
20-24 yrs	26**	(72.2)	18	(54.5)	
Men	27**	(75.0)	17	(51.5)	
Women	22	(61.1)	17	(51.5)	

^{*} For example, 24 of the 36 state beer tax increases were followed by a relative proportionate decrease in the gonorrhea rate among men and women aged 15–19 years in the state with the tax increase. Full details of the analysis are available in reference 5.

methods of analysis yielded similar results and were consistent under a wide range of robustness checks and alternative model specifications (5). The results of this study are consistent with a study that higher minimum legal drinking ages were associated with decreases in childbearing rates among teenagers (8).

The findings in this report are subject to at least two limitations. First, because state gonorrhea reporting practices vary, state-specific gonorrhea rates should be compared with caution. Second, the analysis may be subject to confounding effects of unobservable factors (e.g., community norms regarding alcohol consumption and sexual behavior or dramatic shifts in state-specific STD rates); omitting these variables could cause substantial bias when comparing across states the association between alcohol policy indicators and alcohol-related health outcomes (9,10). Given these limitations, the study findings, particularly the temporal relation between higher alcohol taxes and a decline in gonorrhea rates, are consistent with but do not prove a causal relation between higher taxes and declining STD rates.

The postulated causal relation is based on the assumptions that higher alcohol taxes and a higher minimum legal drinking age can reduce alcohol consumption, and that reduced alcohol consumption can reduce participation in risky sexual behavior. With few exceptions (2,9,10), most studies have demonstrated that alcohol consumption declines after alcohol tax increases (3,5) and have detected an association between risky sexual behavior and alcohol or drug use (2).

[†] The analysis included 36 instances of a beer tax increase. Some states had more than one tax increase over the period of analysis. Three (out of 39) instances of increases were omitted, two because the tax increase was followed by a tax decrease in the subsequent year, and one because of incomplete gonorrhea incidence data. These omissions could have affected the significance values, although for men in both age groups, the p-value would not have increased above 0.05.

For 15–19-year-olds, the analysis included all drinking age increases regardless of the ages affected by the increase. Some states had more than one drinking age increase over the period of analysis. The analysis included 44 instances of a drinking age increase; four (out of 48) increases were omitted because of incomplete gonorrhea incidence data. These instances of omissions could have affected the significance values. For 20–24-year-olds, drinking age increases to only ages 20–21 years were included, for a sample size of 33 increases. Four (out of 37) instances of increases were omitted because of incomplete gonorrhea incidence data. Including all instances of drinking age increases regardless of the ages affected by the increase (as in the analysis for 15–19-year-olds) did not affect the results for 20–24-year-olds (the p-values were not significant).

[¶]p<0.10.

^{**}p<0.05.

Alcohol Policies and STDs — Continued

Reducing alcohol use and risky sexual behavior among young persons are two national health objectives for 2010 (4). Higher alcohol prices and improved enforcement of minimum legal drinking age requirements have been highlighted as potential strategies to reduce alcohol consumption by youth (4). Alcohol policy also could be used to reduce risky sexual behavior and its adverse medical and social consequences. Additional research is needed to continue examining the relation between alcohol policy and risky sexual behavior.

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Progress Toward Global Poliomyelitis Eradication, 1999

In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis globally by the end of 2000 (1). Since then, substantial progress has been made in implementing polio eradication strategies (2), and during 1999 these activities were accelerated to reach the global target. The number of countries where polio is endemic decreased, and the number and quality of vaccination rounds increased. Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance improved, and political commitment and the global partnership for polio eradication strengthened. This report updates progress toward achieving the polio eradication goal during 1999.

PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES

Routine Vaccination

During 1990–1997, reported coverage with three doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV3) was approximately 80% globally. In 1998, OPV3 coverage decreased to 72%, reflecting the decline in coverage in four World Health Organization (WHO) regions (African, Eastern Mediterranean, European, and South-East Asian).

Supplementary Vaccination

In 1999, approximately 470 million children aged <5 years in 83 countries were vaccinated during National Immunization Days* (NIDs) or Subnational Immunization Days† (SNIDs). The number of NID rounds in priority countries (i.e., those considered major global virus reservoirs or affected by conflict) increased (e.g., Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo [DR Congo], and India). In India, approximately 1 billion OPV doses were distributed during four NID and two SNID rounds during October 1999–March 2000. Three rounds of NIDs in DR Congo reached approximately 8 million children in 1999.

House-to-house vaccination was used increasingly during 1999 NIDs and SNIDs both in high-risk areas during "intensified NIDs" (e.g., in India) and exclusively in large-scale SNIDs in Nigeria and Pakistan. In Nigeria, house-to-house SNIDs reached 20%–40% (depending on the state) more children aged <5 years compared with the last fixed-post NID round.

Mopping-up Vaccination

Although additional SNIDs were conducted in border and other high-risk areas, few large-scale house-to-house vaccination activities (mopping-up campaigns) were conducted in 1999. An intense mopping-up campaign was conducted in southeast Turkey and in neighboring provinces in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, targeting the last known foci of transmission in the entire European Region and bordering countries in the Eastern Mediterranean Region.

AFP Surveillance

AFP surveillance requires detection, investigation, and reporting of AFP cases among children aged <15 years. AFP is monitored by two main performance indicators: 1) the reported AFP rate not attributable to polio (i.e., nonpolio AFP rate) to assess the sensitivity of AFP reporting (target: nonpolio AFP rate of ≥ 1 cases per 100,000 population aged <15 years); and 2) the completeness of specimen collection (target: two adequate stool specimens§ from $\geq 80\%$ of persons with AFP). In 1999, 30,003 AFP cases (Table 1) were reported globally (24,657 in 1998), and the number of cases reported from the African Region tripled during 1998–1999. Average specimen collection rates were maintained or improved in four of the six WHO regions; the decreased rate in the African Region reflected a major polio outbreak in Angola (3). The American Region was certified poliofree in 1994; three WHO regions have surpassed or are approaching certification level standards (e.g., achieving a nonpolio AFP rate of ≥ 1 cases per 100,000 population aged <15 years, with adequate stool specimens from $\geq 80\%$ of persons with AFP).

Laboratory Network

In December 1999, the Global Polio Laboratory Network comprised 126 national (or subnational), 16 regional, and six specialized laboratories; 108 (73%) laboratories were fully accredited, 16 (11%) were provisionally accredited, 14 (9%) were reviewed but not

^{*}Mass campaigns over a short period (days to weeks) in which two doses of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) are administered to all children, usually aged <5 years, regardless of vaccination history, with an interval of 4–6 weeks between doses.

[†] Focal mass campaigns in high-risk areas over a short period (days to weeks) in which two doses of OPV are administered to all children in the target age group, regardless of vaccination history, with an interval of 4–6 weeks between doses.

[§] Two stool specimens, collected 24 to 48 hours apart within 14 days of onset of paralysis, that arrive in the laboratory in good condition.

Poliomyelitis Eradication — Continued

TABLE 1. Number of reported acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) cases, surveillance quality indicators, and number of confirmed poliomyelitis cases, by World Health Organization region — 1998 and 1999*

	No. rep	oorted cases	Nonpolio AFP rate [†]		% persons AFP with a specim	adequate	Confirmed polio (Wild virus-associated)				
Region	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999	1	998	1999		
African	1,699	4,949	0.30	0.80	36%	31%	993	(96)	2,825	(238)	
American	1,662	2,059	0.95	1.16	73%	68%	0	(0)	0	(0)	
Eastern Mediterranean	2,216	3,010	0.88	1.16	64%	69%	555	(230)	814	(462)	
European	1,308	1,776	0.94	1.23	67%	74%	26	(26)	0	(0)	
South-East Asian	11,352	11,876	1.25	1.57	60%	71%	4,775	(1,942)	3,330	(1,161)	
Western Pacific	6,420	6,333	1.43	1.39	86%	86%	0	(0)	1	(1)	
Total	24,657	30,003	1.08	1.36	67%	67%	6,349	(2,294)	6,970	(1,862)	

^{*} As of March 30, 2000.

[†] Number of AFP cases per 100,000 children aged <15 years.

[§] Two stool specimens, collected 24 to 48 hours apart within 14 days of onset of paralysis, that arrive in the laboratory in good condition.


accredited, and 10 (7%) were pending review (4). Globally, the laboratory network processed an estimated 50,000 stool specimens for viral isolation during 1999; approximately 3000 polioviruses were isolated. Serotyping, intratypic differentiation, and genomic sequencing were performed on most wild isolates.

IMPACT OF STRATEGIES ON POLIO INCIDENCE

During 1998–1999, the number of known or suspected countries where polio is endemic decreased from 50 to 30 (Figure 1). Type 2 poliovirus is almost extinct, with the only known remaining foci existing in northern India (5). Genetic sequencing data from reservoir countries confirm that additional chains of type 1 and type 3 polio transmission have been broken and virus sublineages have become extinct.

From 1998 to 1999, reported polio cases increased 10% (from 6349 to 6970), reflecting the improved AFP reporting from Africa and the wild poliovirus type 3 outbreak in Angola (3). Poliovirus circulation in the African Region is confined largely to the Horn of Africa and western and central Africa (6). Polio cases reported from the South-East Asian Region decreased from 4775 (1998) to 3330 (1999). This decline was attributed to decreased transmission in central and southern India; however, endemicity remains high in northern India and Bangladesh. In 1999 in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, 814 polio cases were reported (555 cases in 1998). Following the certification of the American Region as polio-free in 1994, the Western Pacific Region in 2000 will be the second WHO region to be certified formally as polio-free (7).

FIGURE 1. Countries with known or probable wild poliovirus transmission — World Health Organization, 1999*



^{*}As of March 13, 2000.

PREPARING FOR THE POST-ERADICATION ERA

The criteria for certification of polio-free status (first by WHO region, then globally), defined by the Global Commission for the Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication, requires that no indigenous wild poliovirus be found through optimal AFP surveillance for at least 3 years. Regional and national polio certification commissions are reviewing progress toward polio eradication in all WHO regions. A plan for increasing biocontainment of wild polioviruses to a small number of high biosafety laboratories has been prepared and initial implementation has begun in several WHO regions.

Reported by: Vaccines and Biologicals Div, World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. Respiratory and Enteric Viruses Br, Div of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases; Vaccine Preventable Disease Eradication Div, National Immunization Program, CDC.

Editorial Note: Since 1988, substantial progress in polio eradication has been reported from all six WHO regions (2). In 1999, progress made in accelerating global polio eradication included 1) passage of a resolution by all WHO member states to support accelerated polio eradication; 2) implementation of four NIDs in India (approximately 140 million children reached in each round) and two additional SNIDs in eight northern Indian states; 3) vaccination of millions of children in countries affected by conflict; 4) a dramatic increase in AFP surveillance quality; and 5) expansion of the global polio eradication partnership to include the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the United Nations Foundation, and the Aventis Pasteur company.

A multisector approach is needed in many countries to improve the quality of supplementary vaccination activities to ensure that every child is reached. Although more children are being vaccinated, many are unreached because of poor planning, inadequate social mobilization, and civil conflict. During 2000, efforts have been targeted at overcoming these obstacles, including augmentation of country-level technical and administrative capacity.

The continuing surveillance achievements in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan demonstrate that high-quality surveillance can be implemented even in the most difficult circumstances. The success of the United Nations Secretary General and other partners in establishing "days of tranquility" for NIDs during 1999 in DR Congo demonstrated the feasibility of working successfully in conflict-affected areas. Sustaining political commitment is essential in stopping polio and is critical in implementing high-quality eradication activities in remaining countries where polio is endemic. Some countries, particularly in the African Region, have stopped NIDs despite surveillance sensitivity that remains well below certification standards.

Although substantial progress toward global polio eradication has been made during 1999, the interruption of virus transmission by the end of 2000 or as soon as possible will be feasible only if extraordinary efforts are taken in priority countries where polio is endemic, including 1) conducting extra NID rounds during the rest of 2000 and in 2001; 2) improving the quality of NIDs to reach all children, particularly children who have never received vaccine; 3) improving and maintaining AFP surveillance; 4) procuring sufficient vaccine to allow completion of polio eradication activities during 2000 and 2001; 5) expanding efforts to establish days of tranquility and truces to allow vaccination of children in countries affected by conflict; 6) meeting the projected financial shortage in

external resources required through 2005[¶]; and 7) strengthening and maintaining political commitment.

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Notice to Readers

National Melanoma/Skin Cancer Detection and Prevention Month — May 2000


May is National Melanoma/Skin Cancer Detection and Prevention Month. This month is dedicated to increasing public awareness of the importance of skin cancer prevention, early detection, and treatment, including basal cell, squamous cell, and melanoma. The American Cancer Society estimates that in 2000, approximately 1.3 million new cases of highly curable basal cell and squamous cell carcinomas will be detected, approximately 47,700 new cases of malignant melanoma will be diagnosed, and approximately 9600 persons will die from skin cancer (1). Although death rates from basal cell and squamous cell carcinomas are low, these cancers can cause considerable damage and disfigurement if they are untreated. However, when detected early, approximately 95% of these carcinomas can be cured.

Data from the National Cancer Institute and CDC show new cases of melanoma increased 4.3% during 1973–1990 and 2.5% during 1990–1995; deaths from melanoma increased 1.7% during 1973–1990 and declined 0.4% during 1990–1995 (2). Among whites, the racial/ethnic population at highest risk, death rates for melanoma are twice as high among men as among women. National health objectives for 2010 include reducing the rate of melanoma deaths from 2.8 per 100,000 population in 1998 to 2.5 per 100,000 (3).

Exposure to the sun's ultraviolet (UV) rays appears to be the most important preventable factor in the development of skin cancer. Skin cancer is largely preventable when

The polio eradication initiative is supported by the national governments. External support is provided by the global polio eradication partnership (WHO; United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF]; Rotary International; CDC; U.S. Agency for International Development; and the governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, and others). New partners include the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the United Nations Foundation, and the Aventis Pasteur Company.

FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, comparison of provisional 4-week totals ending April 22, 2000, with historical data — United States



^{*}Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals.

TABLE I. Summary — provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, cumulative, week ending April 22, 2000 (16th Week)

		Cum. 2000		Cum. 2000
Anthrax		_	HIV infection, pediatric*§	32
Brucellosis*		8	Plaque	2
Cholera		1 -	Poliomyelitis, paralytic	_
Congenital ru	bella syndrome	1	Psittacosis*	4
Cyclosporiasis		4	Rabies, human	-
Diphtheria		-	Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF)	29
Encephalitis:	California* serogroup viral	2	Streptococcal disease, invasive Group A	974
	eastern equine*	-	Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome*	35
	St. Louis*	-	Syphilis, congenital [¶]	10
	western equine*	-	Tetanus	5
Ehrlichiosis	human granulocytic (HGE)*	19	Toxic-shock syndrome	43
	human monocytic (HME)*	1	Trichinosis	2
Hansen Disease*		11	Typhoid fever	92
Hantavirus pu	ılmonary syndrome*†	2	Yellowfever	-
Hemolytic ure	emic syndrome, post-diarrheal*	25		

^{-:} no reported cases

^{*}Not notifiable in all states.

† Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases (NCID).

§ Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention—Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV,

STD, and TB Prevention (NCHSTP), last update March 26, 2000. Updated from reports to the Division of STD Prevention, NCHSTP.

TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 22, 2000, and April 24, 1999 (16th Week)

									coli O157:H7	
ŀ	Cum.	Cum.	Chlan Cum.	nydia⁵ Cum.	Cryptosı Cum.	ooridiosis Cum.	NET Cum.	Cum.	PHI Cum.	LIS Cum.
Reporting Area	2000†	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000	1999
UNITED STATES NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt.	10,143 666 11 8	12,852 661 5 24 5	162,696 6,405 368 330 178	200,688 6,473 209 322 152	316 16 3 1 8	461 24 2 4 2	421 34 3 4 1	347 52 4 3 6	252 36 3 4 2	297 47 - 5 1
Mass. R.I. Conn.	446 21 179	480 30 117	3,052 677 1,800	2,791 682 2,317	2 2	13 - 3	12 - 14	26 1 12	13 - 14	22 2 17
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	2,471 131 1,441 563 336	3,278 400 1,665 668 545	7,514 N 778 1,211 5,525	24,092 N 11,522 3,870 8,700	31 22 5 - 4	101 30 57 7 7	51 50 1 - N	21 16 2 3 N	45 38 - 2 5	13 1 - 12
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	921 139 88 542 114 38	867 165 124 402 126 50	27,661 6,797 3,775 7,548 7,604 1,937	31,689 9,818 3,623 8,235 6,594 3,419	55 14 5 3 10 23	73 11 7 7 10 38	77 17 16 24 12 8	64 26 12 15 11 N	19 7 6 - 3 3	48 15 8 12 7 6
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	203 44 15 90 - 2 13 39	266 45 30 105 4 6 17 59	7,585 1,857 991 1,472 61 533 763 1,908	11,677 2,356 1,216 4,226 299 508 1,133 1,939	25 4 5 8 1 3 2 2	26 11 4 5 - 2 3	81 18 16 34 2 2 2	72 15 8 8 3 1 30 7	57 27 4 14 4 1 4 3	69 18 2 6 2 4 37
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	2,848 45 271 186 221 15 128 232 300 1,450	3,490 40 459 119 198 19 267 376 350 1,662	33,330 899 3,358 1,049 4,620 450 6,098 1,355 6,085 9,416	40,794 878 4,178 N 4,323 655 7,278 6,223 8,075 9,184	57 1 5 - 2 - 6 - 32 11	78 - 5 3 1 - 1 - 52 16	35 - 5 - 6 2 8 2 3	33 1 2 - 8 1 7 2 1 11	17 - 1 U 5 1 2 - 3	24 - U 7 1 7 1 U 8
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	415 56 172 120 67	607 104 259 111 133	14,847 2,446 4,472 5,175 2,754	14,086 2,391 4,410 3,612 3,673	12 - 2 7 3	4 1 2 1	24 8 9 1 6	26 8 9 4 5	14 4 8 - 2	13 5 4 3 1
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	824 42 143 42 597	1,536 55 154 46 1,281	27,011 1,682 5,114 2,300 17,915	26,712 1,719 4,156 2,399 18,438	10 1 - 1 8	30 15 1 14	17 4 - 4 9	10 3 3 3 1	24 3 11 3 7	21 3 3 4 11
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	342 5 6 2 70 40 115 41 63	434 4 8 3 102 17 187 37 76	8,817 328 556 235 997 1,138 3,929 770 864	10,542 427 550 239 2,242 1,440 4,071 576 997	24 1 3 1 6 1 3 8 1	27 2 2 - 4 11 7 N 1	38 8 4 3 12 3 6 1 1	25 1 2 9 2 5 6	14 - - 2 6 - 5 1	21 - 3 3 4 1 3 6
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	1,453 148 35 1,230 5 35	1,713 88 45 1,541 6 33	29,526 4,014 1,466 22,611 766 669	34,623 3,643 1,884 27,494 623 979	86 N 2 84 -	98 N 8 90	64 8 9 42 1 4	44 10 13 20 - 1	26 13 9 - - 4	41 17 10 13 - 1
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	13 187 16 -	1 413 11 - -	142 - - - -	142 U U U U	- - - -	- U U U	N - - -	N 6 U U	U U U U	U U U U

N: Not notifiable

U: Unavailable

-: no reported cases

C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands

*Individual cases may be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

*Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention—Surveillance and Epidemiology, National Center for HIV, STD, and TB Prevention, last update March 26, 2000.

*Chlamydia refers to genital infections caused by C. trachomatis. Totals reported to the Division of STD Prevention, NCHSTP.

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 22, 2000, and April 24, 1999 (16th Week)

	Weeks ending April 22, 2000, and April 24, 1939 (10th Week)												
	Gono	rrhea		oatitis NA,NB	Legion	ellosis		/me sease					
Reporting Area	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999					
UNITED STATES	84,955	106,531	689	1,109	205	270	958	1,449					
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	1,730 25 27 16 782 167 713	2,151 17 22 18 840 183 1,071	20 - - 2 18 - -	4 - - 2 1 1	12 2 2 - 5 - 3	19 2 2 3 5 1 6	108 - 18 1 49 - 40	372 1 - - 132 10 229					
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	5,303 1,769 233 643 2,658	12,901 1,759 4,972 2,270 3,900	13 13 - - -	39 19 - - 20	38 17 - - 21	77 20 10 5 42	666 326 4 - 336	769 242 24 132 371					
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	17,404 3,918 1,690 5,264 5,338 1,194	18,896 5,217 2,044 5,858 4,390 1,387	73 1 - 5 67	636 - - 11 205 420	56 26 12 3 10 5	79 23 6 10 25 15	7 7 - - - Ū	58 12 2 2 1 41					
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	2,572 745 199 529 4 75 241	4,877 853 287 2,371 29 44 524 769	160 1 - 146 - - 1 12	48 - - 46 - - 2	15 1 3 8 - 1 - 2	10 - 4 4 - 1 1	40 11 1 7 - - 21	21 8 2 7 1 - - 3					
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	24,363 488 2,332 741 3,339 118 5,387 1,524 3,911 6,523	31,078 530 4,063 2,102 2,890 195 6,284 2,947 5,571 6,496	35 - 5 - 1 2 8 - 19	74 - 21 - 6 11 18 12 1	44 4 12 - 3 N 5 2 2 16	29 2 4 - 6 N 5 6	111 10 77 - 8 4 4 - 8	156 7 123 1 3 4 16 1					
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	10,353 994 3,354 3,807 2,198	11,062 1,107 3,405 3,282 3,268	122 15 27 4 76	74 5 31 1 37	6 4 1 1	14 7 5 2	- - - -	20 2 6 6 6					
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	14,223 876 3,784 1,007 8,556	15,148 804 3,675 1,266 9,403	134 3 44 1 86	115 5 89 3 18	2 - - 1 1	1 - 1 - -	- - - -	- - - -					
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	3,028 4 26 21 995 250 1,292 89 351	2,885 16 27 9 669 246 1,475 61 382	75 1 - 44 12 4 11 - 3	72 4 4 28 9 11 13 1	14 - 1 1 6 1 2 3	18 - - 1 1 1 9 6	- - - - - - - -	3 - - 1 - 1 - 1					
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	5,979 722 168 4,915 91 83	7,533 656 276 6,342 117 142	57 7 12 38 -	47 3 6 38 -	18 5 N 13 -	23 5 N 17 1	26 - 2 24 - N	50 - 2 48 - N					
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	97 - - -	20 122 U U U	- 1 - - -	- U U U	- - - -	- U U U	N - - -	N U U U					

N: Not notifiable

U: Unavailable

-: no reported cases

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 22, 2000, and April 24, 1999 (16th Week)

	WCCKSC	namy Ap	111 22, 20	oo, ana A	Salmonellosis*							
	Mal	laria	Rabie	s, Animal	NE	TSS		ILIS				
Reporting Area	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999				
UNITED STATES	245	336	1,375	1,625	6,479	7,459	4,072	6,792				
NEW ENGLAND Maine N.H. Vt. Mass. R.I. Conn.	6 1 - 1 2 - 2	6 - 1 5 -	182 48 3 13 59 5	256 41 16 46 53 32 68	432 37 25 35 241 16 78	434 29 18 15 257 21	415 15 25 35 234 26 80	452 19 17 18 256 35 107				
MID. ATLANTIC Upstate N.Y. N.Y. City N.J. Pa.	32 15 11 - 6	107 22 49 26 10	266 198 U 41 27	311 199 U 69 43	686 234 219 24 209	1,133 229 345 272 287	717 199 223 124 171	804 251 313 228 12				
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio Ind. III. Mich. Wis.	27 3 2 13 9	36 4 6 15 8 3	9 2 - - 7 -	12 3 - - 9 -	991 256 114 315 172 134	1,184 243 81 388 264 208	508 173 91 1 173 70	1,009 195 84 372 240 118				
W.N. CENTRAL Minn. Iowa Mo. N. Dak. S. Dak. Nebr. Kans.	12 4 - 1 - - 1 6	13 2 3 7 - - 1	131 24 18 3 26 32	200 27 37 7 30 60 1 38	336 43 46 130 4 20 29 64	426 124 51 121 8 17 40 65	364 115 25 127 18 23 22 34	533 185 47 165 18 25 38 55				
S. ATLANTIC Del. Md. D.C. Va. W. Va. N.C. S.C. Ga. Fla.	67 1 24 2 16 - 7 - 1 16	74 - 24 6 15 1 6 - 6	593 10 129 - 141 35 123 45 67 43	586 17 132 - 135 33 131 44 46 48	1,273 15 187 1 147 33 201 104 226 359	1,380 26 176 26 167 22 260 86 260 357	738 22 162 U 114 26 122 74 212 6	1,193 32 184 U 136 24 245 87 342 143				
E.S. CENTRAL Ky. Tenn. Ala. Miss.	10 2 1 6 1	8 2 3 3	56 9 32 15	83 19 26 38	346 70 89 123 64	403 85 110 123 85	185 36 67 74 8	263 63 101 84 15				
W.S. CENTRAL Ark. La. Okla. Tex.	2 1 1 -	11 2 7 1 1	23 - - 23 -	34 - - 34 -	411 66 27 64 254	551 71 97 74 309	431 22 95 46 268	536 61 99 53 323				
MOUNTAIN Mont. Idaho Wyo. Colo. N. Mex. Ariz. Utah Nev.	16 1 - 8 - 2 3 2	15 2 1 - 5 2 4 1	50 13 - 21 - 3 13 -	50 18 - 18 1 - 13 -	672 23 37 8 201 53 191 108 51	621 8 21 6 195 74 176 93 48	427 - - 3 149 44 144 87	603 1 27 9 200 79 150 95 42				
PACIFIC Wash. Oreg. Calif. Alaska Hawaii	73 5 17 50 - 1	66 5 7 49 - 5	65 - - 55 10 -	93 - 1 87 5 -	1,332 83 92 1,080 20 57	1,327 109 104 1,011 10 93	287 127 107 - 8 45	1,399 197 135 978 5				
Guam P.R. V.I. Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	- - - -	- U U U	- 12 - - -	30 U U U	- 7 - -	18 115 U U U	U U U U	U U U U				

N: Not notifiable U: Unavailable -: no reported cases
*Individual cases may be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

TABLE II. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending April 22, 2000, and April 24, 1999 (16th Week)

	<u>weeks er</u>			00, and A	<u>pril 24, 1</u>	999 (16th	Week)			
	NET:	Shigel SS		PHLIS		philis & Secondary)	Tuberculosis			
Damantina Avaa	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.	Cum.		
Reporting Area UNITED STATES	2000 3,906	1999 3,623	2000 1,666	2,097	2000 1,776	1999 2,049	2000 2,658	1999 [†] 4,038		
NEW ENGLAND	81	87	69	82	24	23	85	103		
Maine N.H.	2 1	1 6	- 1	- 5	-	-	2 2	6 -		
Vt. Mass.	1 56	4 55	<u>:</u> 49	3 53	20	1 13	- 58	- 50		
R.I.	8	12	7	8	1	1	7	15		
Conn. MID. ATLANTIC	13 387	9 301	12 316	13 166	3 47	8 89	16 555	32 670		
Upstate N.Y.	235	64	94	22	4	7	53	73		
N.Y. City N.J.	121 -	101 86	155 35	84 60	8 11	36 20	322 148	317 145		
Pa.	31	50	32	-	24	26	32	135		
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio	653 49	628 189	234 33	320 31	385 22	321 27	328 51	329 68		
Ind. III.	108 208	22 237	11 2	9 210	148 107	93 140	19 203	19 148		
Mich. Wis.	231 57	92 88	179 9	56 14	88 20	49 12	30 25	69 25		
W.N. CENTRAL	281	∞ 208	9 171	163	20 19	50	25 142	25 137		
Minn.	47	29	60	32 3	2	5 3	49 11	62		
lowa Mo.	48 147	2 142	21 76	108	8 5	35	60	7 50		
N. Dak. S. Dak.	1 1	2 5	1 -	2 3	-	-	8	1 3		
Nebr. Kans.	18 19	14 14	8 5	8 7	2 2	4 3	3 11	4 10		
S. ATLANTIC	576	596	107	137	559	736	538	801		
Del. Md.	3 33	7 3 8	3 10	2 8	2 97	1 150	- 66	11 68		
D.C. Va.	24	22 21	Ü 15	Ŭ 5	17 40	43 52	2 46	14 83		
W. Va.	2	3	2	1	1	2	13	12		
N.C. S.C.	36 5	71 32	16 4	35 12	170 19	172 81	83 22	121 103		
Ga. Fla.	68 405	66 336	25 32	24 50	101 112	125 110	128 178	152 237		
E.S. CENTRAL	193	365	91	197	286	368	179	233		
Ky. Tenn.	36 104	36 259	21 63	24 154	30 182	39 181	31 67	30 76		
Ala. Miss.	9 44	43 27	5 2	18 1	41 33	96 52	81 -	93 34		
W.S. CENTRAL	389	581	334	260	259	301	70	617		
Ark. La.	66 19	38 51	3 50	21 38	30 63	26 63	43	40 U		
Okla. Tex.	9 295	148 344	6 275	45 156	58 108	67 145	27	29 548		
MOUNTAIN	289	207	98	118	60	61	112	129		
Mont. Idaho	2 24	3	-	3	-	-	4 2	-		
Wyo.	1	2 39	1	1	1	-	-	- U		
Colo. N. Mex.	40 31	30	21 15	27 18	1 7	2	14 19	21		
Ariz. Utah	118 20	106 15	43 18	50 15	49 -	58 1	44 10	64 12		
Nev.	53	9	-	4	2	-	19	32		
PACIFIC Wash.	1,057 193	650 29	246 188	654 38	137 18	100 16	649 57	1,019 48		
Oreg. Calif.	80 764	18 587	49	19 582	2 117	1 81	- 541	28 878		
Alaska Hawaii	7 7 13	16	1 8	15	-	1	20 31	18 47		
Guam	-	3	U	U	-	-	- -	-		
P.R. V.I.	1	21 U	Ŭ	Ŭ	29	63 U	-	61 U		
Amer. Samoa C.N.M.I.	-	Ü	Ü	Ü	-	Ü	-	Ü		
U.14.141.1.						U				

N: Not notifiable
U: Unavailable
-: no reported cases
*Individual cases may be reported through both the National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS) and the Public Health Laboratory Information System (PHLIS).

†Cumulative reports of provisional tuberculosis cases for 1999 are unavailable ("U") for some areas using the Tuberculosis Information System (TIMS).

TABLE III. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending April 22, 2000, and April 24, 1999 (16th Week)

	H. influ	ienzae.	Hepatitis (Viral), by type				T	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Meas	les (Rubec	ola)	
	inva		Α		В		Indige	nous	Impo		Tota	l
Reporting Area	Cum. 2000†	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999	2000	Cum. 2000	2000	Cum. 2000	Cum. 2000	Cum. 1999
UNITED STATES	379	390	3,452	5,750	1,449	1,884	3	9	-	3	12	36
NEW ENGLAND	21	27	82_	67	14	52	-	-	-	-	-	4
Maine N.H.	1 6	2 5	5 8	2 7	2 6	4	-	-	-	-	-	- 1
Vt. Mass.	2 7	4 10	3 35	1 23	3 3	1 23	-	-	-	-	-	3
R.I.	1	_	1	6	-	8	-	-		-	-	-
Conn. MID. ATLANTIC	4	6 62	30 148	28 378	158	16 279	U	-	U	-	-	2
Upstate N.Y.	53 26	24	75	76	31	56	-	-	-	-	-	2
N.Y. City N.J.	11 12	20 17	73 -	106 48	127 -	93 35	U	-	U	-	-	-
Pa.	4	1	-	148	-	95	-	-	-	-	-	-
E.N. CENTRAL Ohio	52 22	56 22	448 112	1,169 253	160 33	175 31	-	3 2	-	-	3 2	-
Ind.	7	6	16	44	12	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
III. Mich.	19 4	23 5	154 153	223 614	2 112	122	-	1	-	-	1	-
Wis.	-	-	13	35	1	12	-	-	-	-	-	-
W.N. CENTRAL Minn.	15 7	25 11	400 36	249 18	101 6	87 12	-	1	-	-	1	-
lowa	-	1	36	52	16	15	U	-	U	-	-	-
Mo. N. Dak.	4 1	6	233	140	59 -	50 -	-	-	-	-	-	-
S. Dak. Nebr.	- 1	1 3	- 7	8 2 5	- 8	- 9	Ū	-	Ū	-	-	-
Kans.	ż	3	88	6	12	1	-	1	-	-	1	-
S. ATLANTIC	109	84	421	512	319	310	-	-	-	-	-	3
Del. Md.	25	24	52	1 113	38	67	-	-	-	-	-	-
D.C. Va.	20	2 9	2 49	22 41	6 42	7 29	-	-	-	-	-	3
W. Va. N.C.	3 8	1 16	33 65	5 43	2 81	8 69	-	-	-	-	-	-
S.C.	5	2	13	7	2	34	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ga. Fla.	31 17	21 9	53 154	153 127	45 103	38 58	-	-	-	-	-	-
E.S. CENTRAL	20	29	106	145	88	145	-	-	-	-	-	2
Ky. Tenn.	9 8	5 12	18 21	29 61	21 28	12 64	-	-	-	-	-	2
Ala.	3	10	22 45	28 27	8 31	38 31	Ū	-	Ū	-	-	-
Miss. W.S. CENTRAL	20	29	45 553	1,307	72	243	U	-	U	-	-	2
Ark.	-	1	55	14	27	21	-	-	-	-	-	-
La. Okla.	3 17	8 18	11 111	53 191	18 27	61 43	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tex.	-	2	376	1,049	-	118	-	-	-	-	-	2
MOUNTAIN Mont.	49	43 1	283 1	508 5	130 3	160 7	3	5	-	-	5	-
ldaho	2	1	11	17	4	9	U	-	U	-	-	-
Wyo. Colo.	11	1 5	6 55	2 90	27	2 29	1	1	-	-	1	-
N. Mex. Ariz.	10 22	10 21	30 146	17 312	33 48	45 38	-	-	-	-	-	-
Utah	4	3	18	21	4	8	2	2	-	-	2	-
Nev. PACIFIC	- 40	1 35	16 1 011	44	11 407	22	-	2	-	-	2 3	22
Wash.	3	-	1,011 65	1,415 90	15	433 17	-	-	-	3	-	23 5 8
Oreg. Calif.	13 11	14 17	71 871	88 1,230	33 351	36 368	-	-	-	3	3	8 10
Alaska Hawaii	1 12	3	4	4	3 5	7 5	-	-	-	-	-	- -
Guam	-	-	-	2	-	2	U	_	U	-	-	_
P.R.	-	1	26	75	17	76	Ū	-	Ū	-	-	-
V.I. Amer. Samoa	-	U	-	U U	-	U	Ü	-	Ū	-	-	U U
C.N.M.I.	-	U	-	U	-	U	U	-	U	-	-	U

N: Not notifiable U: Unavailable -: no reported cases
*For imported measles, cases include only those resulting from importation from other countries.

†Of 85 cases among children aged <5 years, serotype was reported for 37 and of those, 7 were type b.

TABLE III. (Cont'd) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases preventable by vaccination, United States, weeks ending April 22, 2000, and April 24, 1999 (16th Week)

Meningococcal Disease Mumps Pertussis Ruber	Cum. 1999 27
Reporting Area 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 2000 1999 2000 2000 1999 2000 2000 1999 2000 2000 1999 2000 2000 1999 2000 2000 1999 2000 2000 2000 1999 2000	1999 27
UNITED STATES 770 884 6 117 127 70 1,228 1,894 3 19	27
NEW ENGLAND 45 51 - 2 3 3 330 164 - 5	_
	6
Maine 3 3 9 N.H. 3 9 1 - 49 21 - 1	-
Vt. 2 3 2 67 9 Mass. 28 29 2 1 186 126 - 3	6
R.I. 2 2 - 1 7 3	-
Conn. 7 5 U 1 - U 12 5 U 1 MID.ATLANTIC 70 86 - 7 15 3 111 405 - 2	2
Upstate N.Y. 14 21 - 5 2 3 69 351 - 2	2
N.Y. City 16 28 U - 3 U - 10 U - N.J. 18 14 9	-
Pa. 22 23 - 2 10 - 42 35	-
E.N. CENTRAL 129 159 - 14 16 3 175 166 Ohio 26 56 - 6 6 - 131 92	-
Ind. 19 15 3 12 8	-
III. 35 53 - 3 4 - 13 27 Mich. 37 18 - 5 6 - 9 18	-
Wis. 12 17 10 21	-
W.N. CENTRAL 61 109 - 9 3 6 46 38 - 2 Minn. 3 25 6 21	6
lowa 12 20 U 3 2 U 9 13 U - Mo. 38 41 - 1 1 - 7 10	-
N. Dak. 1 1	-
S. Dak. 4 5 1 2 Nebr. 1 7 U 2 - U 2 1 U -	6
Kans. 2 11 - 3 5 12 - 2	-
S.ATLANTIC 122 124 2 16 23 7 95 85 - 6 Del 2 1	2
Md. 11 23 - 4 4 2 28 32	1
D.C 1 1 Va. 19 19 1 4 7 - 10 12	-
W. Va. 3 2 1 N.C. 25 17 - 2 5 - 28 22	- 1
S.C. 8 18 1 6 2 1 15 6 - 6	-
Ga. 22 23 4 13 6 Fla. 34 19 4 6	-
E.S. CENTRAL 56 71 2 3 3 - 26 43 3 4	-
Ky. 12 12 15 12 - 1 Tenn. 25 26 2 2 2 21	-
Ala. 16 21 - 1 1 - 8 8 3 3 Miss. 3 12 U - 2 U 1 2 U -	-
W.S. CENTRAL 51 66 - 1 15 1 6 48	5
Ark. 5 15 - 1 - 1 6 4 La. 13 33 2 2 -	-
Okla. 17 15 1 3	-
Tex. 16 3 12 39	5
MOUNTAIN 49 67 1 8 8 26 261 230 Mont. 1 1 1 1 1	4 -
ldaho 6 8 U U 35 87 U - Wyo 2 2	-
Colo. 11 20 - 1 3 16 144 57 N. Mex. 7 8 - 1 N 1 48 13	-
Ariz. 16 20 9 26 42	3
Utah 6 4 1 3 4 - 4 26 Nev. 2 5 - 2 1 - 3 2	1 -
PACIFIC 187 151 1 57 41 21 178 715 -	2
Wash. 14 20 - 2 - 18 64 372 Oreg. 24 30 N N N - 24 8	-
Calif. 144 93 - 51 35 3 81 317 Alaska 2 4 1 3 1 - 5 2 Hawaii 3 4 - 1 5 - 4 16	2
Hawaii 3 4 - 1 5 - 4 16	-
Guam U - 1 U - 1 U -	-
P.R. 1 7	Ū
Amer. Samoa - U U - U U - U U - C.N.M.I U U - U U -	U U

N: Not notifiable

TABLE IV. Deaths in 122 U.S. cities,* week ending April 22, 2000 (16th Week)

		All Cau	ıses, By	Age (Ye	•	,	P&I	O (TOLIT WEE		All Cau	ıses, By	Age (Y	ears)		P&I [†]
Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total	Reporting Area	All Ages	≥65	45-64	25-44	1-24	<1	Total
NEW ENGLAND Boston, Mass. Bridgeport, Conn Cambridge, Mass. Fall River, Mass. Hartford, Conn. Lowell, Mass. Lynn, Mass. New Bedford, Ma New Haven, Conn Providence, R.I. Somerville, Mass Springfield, Mass Waterbury, Conn. Worcester, Mass. MID. ATLANTIC Albany, N.Y. Allentown, Pa. Buffalo, N.Y. Camden, N.J. Elizabeth, N.J.	473 159 . 37 . 10 19 41 18 11 sss. 30 . 42 U	342 1044 33 8 16 26 13 8 25 32 U 3 16 11 11 147 1,498 69 11 11	36 4 2 3 9 4 5 0 1 7 2 13 420 9 U 13 5 5	23 12 - - 4 1 1 U - 2 - 2 141 1 U 4 1	7 4 - - 2 - 1 U - - - - - - 1 U - - - - - - - - -	8 3 - - 3 U - 1 37 1 U 2 2	63 20 1 2 10 3 1 1 9 0 3 3 11 110 7 0 9	S. ATLANTIC Atlanta, Ga. Baltimore, Md. Charlotte, N.C. Jacksonville, Fla Miami, Fla. Norfolk, Va. Richmond, Va. Savannah, Ga. St. Petersburg, F Tampa, Fla. Washington, D.G Wilmington, D.G E.S. CENTRAL Birmingham, Ala Chattanooga, Te Knoxville, Tenn Lexington, Ky. Memphis, Tenn. Mobile, Ala. Montgomery, A	1,126 U 156 73 . 136 102 51 86 34 Fla. 61 195 C. 206 I. 26 836 a. 183 snn. 44 84 54 199 92	737 U 90 45 105 69 34 45 20 50 139 124 16 564 120 31 68 39 122 60 28	222 U 34 16 23 23 10 21 10 3 35 47 - 164 37 9 11 8 40 222 14	114 U 25 10 3 9 4 13 2 4 12 22 10 69 17 24 7 5	28 U 4 1 3 - 1 4 2 2 4 7 - 2 6 2 3 - 8 1 1	22 U 2 1 2 1 2 3 - 2 4 5 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2	70 U 15 1 7 8 2 6 2 6 17 6 - 73 20 4 7 5 12 4 8
Erie, Pa.§ Jersey City, N.J. New York City, N.Y. Newark, N.J. Paterson, N.J. Philadelphia, Pa. Pittsburgh, Pa.§ Reading, Pa. Rochester, N.Y. Schenectady, N.Y. Scranton, Pa.§ Syracuse, N.Y. Trenton, N.J. Utica, N.Y. Yonkers, N.Y.	36 U Y. 1,120 75 14 365 64 22 123	24 U 762 46 9 254 44 18 94 18 23 46 15 20 U	12 U 241 15 2 69 12 2 20 3 4 7	U 78 13 1 29 4 - 6 - 1 2 1 U	U 20 - 1 11 - 2 1 1 - 1 - U	U 18 1 1 2 4 - 2 - 3 1	4 U 24 2 25 3 · 18 4 2 5 5 2 U	Nashville, Tenn. W.S. CENTRAL Austin, Tex. Baton Rouge, La Corpus Christi, 1 Dallas, Tex. El Paso, Tex. Ft. Worth, Tex. Houston, Tex. Little Rock, Ark. New Orleans, La San Antonio, Te Shreveport, La. Tulsa, Okla.	132 1,471 76 . 48 Fex. 54 178 63 114 379 61 . 57 x. 252 75	96 975 51 27 39 104 45 71 249 45 29 169 60 86	23 318 15 19 7 45 10 25 84 10 16 53 13 21	5 99 8 1 2 18 5 8 25 3 6 19 1	1 36 - 1 7 2 2 8 3 4 5 1 3	7 42 2 1 5 4 1 8 3 - 2 5	13 106 2 4 3 17 4 6 22 2 4 20 8 14
E.N. CENTRAL Akron, Ohio Canton, Ohio Canton, Ohio Chicago, Ill. Cincinnati, Ohio Cleveland, Ohio Columbus, Ohio Dayton, Ohio Detroit, Mich. Evansville, Ind. Fort Wayne, Ind. Gary, Ind. Grand Rapids, Mi Indianapolis, Ind. Lansing, Mich. Milwaukee, Wis. Peoria, Ill. Rockford, Ill. South Bend, Ind. Toledo, Ohio Youngstown, Ohi W.N. CENTRAL Des Moines, Iowa Duluth, Minn. Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Kans Kansas City, Mo.	183 50 114 38 48 46 106 0 58 765 1 149 23 . 39 94	1,375 43 280 260 61 U 150 109 98 41 157 155 59 109 33 38 36 77 49 564 118 19 29 722	18 U 34 20 466 13 12 5 8 50 12 23 3 6 7 20 7 136 23 3 6 16	146 5 39 8 U 9 9 25 1 2 3 5 14 3 7 3 3 2 5 1 2 5 3 2 5 1 2 5 5 5 5 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5 7 5	39 - 20 3 - 7 1 3 - 3 - 3 1 14 2 - 1 1 1	58 - 1 12 7 7 U 8 1 11 - 4 7 7 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	16933470UB6926111245242113 649 464	MOUNTAIN Albuquerque, N Boise, Idaho Colo. Springs, C Denver, Colo. Las Vegas, Nev. Ogden, Utah Phoenix, Ariz. Pueblo, Colo. Salt Lake City, U Tucson, Ariz. PACIFIC Berkeley, Calif. Fresno, Calif. Glendale, Calif. Honolulu, Hawa Long Beach, Cal Los Angeles, Cal Pasadena, Calif. Portland, Oreg. Sacramento, Cal San Diego, Calif. San Francisco, C San Jose, Calif. Santa Cruz, Calif. Santa Cruz, Calif. Seattle, Wash. Spokane, Wash.	59 olo. 74 17 7237 377 377 U 23 14ah 94 1,629 18 119 17 ii 69 if. 57 lif. 207 161 201 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 1	607 714 566 655 145 29 U 888 110 71,212 107 714 538 249 152 118 U 108 652	173 16 11 12 23 64 5 U 4 16 22 272 2 22 2 2 1 10 12 68 3 30 5 12 33 30 5 11 11 12 33 12 33 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	70 14 2 4 11 18 3 10 17 10 83 3 7 11 3 5 19 1 7 10 5 10 8 2 8 2 8 2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	16 4 - 1 5 3 - U - 1 2 38 - 6 1 2 2 2 8 - 2 9 4 U 2 - 1 -	17 3 1 1 3 3 7 - U - 2 2 4 3 5 - 4 1 1 3 3 3 U 2 2	88 11 6 6 14 3 6 U 2 24 6 187 4 6 1 5 6 6 6 3 9 38 26 U 25 5 6 7
Lincoln, Nebr. Minneapolis, Min Omaha, Nebr. St. Louis, Mo. St. Paul, Minn. Wichita, Kans.	37 n. 155 74 108 U 86	29 119 51 69 U 58	26 13 23 U	5 6 9 U 2	1 1 5 U 3	1 5 3 2 U 3	4 19 7 2 U 3	Tacoma, Wash.	104 11,348¶	77	16	9 777	1 241	1 244	10 930

U: Unavailable -:no reported cases

*Mortality data in this table are voluntarily reported from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of 100,000 or more.

A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included.

¹Pneumonia and influenza.

¹Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks.

¹Total includes unknown ages.

Notice to Readers — Continued

sun protection measures against UV rays are used consistently. However, approximately 50% of adults in the United States do not practice any such measures (3). Young people have moderate to high awareness of skin cancer but are unaware of the connection between severe sunburns and skin cancer; sunburns, although considered painful and embarrassing, are not perceived as a health threat (4).

CDC's skin cancer prevention and education efforts, including the Choose Your Cover campaign aimed primarily at young people, encourage all people to protect themselves from the sun's UV rays year-round. The overall goals include influencing social norms related to sun protection and tanned skin as well as improving awareness, knowledge, and behaviors related to skin cancer. CDC's efforts focus on 1) informing the public that even a few serious sunburns can increase a person's risk for skin cancer and 2) promoting the Choose Your Cover sun protection options: seeking shade, covering up, wearing a hat and sunglasses, and using sunscreen that has a sun protection factor of 15 or higher and has both UVA and UVB protection. Information on CDC's Choose Your Cover skin cancer prevention campaign is available at http://www.cdc.gov/chooseyourcover.

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